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Abstract: This article aims to bring some work in contemporary analytic
metaphysics to discussions of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. I will
show that some unusual claims of the Real Presence doctrine exactly parallel what
would be happening in the world if objects were to time-travel in certain ways.
Such time-travel would make ordinary objects multiply located, and in the
relevantly analogous respects. If it is conceptually coherent that objects behave in
this way, we have a model for the behaviour of the Eucharist which shows the
doctrine to be coherent, at least with respect to the issues discussed.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to bring some work in contemporary analytic
metaphysics to discussions of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, with
the hope of offering insight into some of the philosophical issues surrounding
the doctrine. The relevant parts of metaphysics are the debate about how objects
continue to exist through time (or persist) and the discussion of the relation of
parts and wholes (mereology). In particular, it concerns the possibility of objects
time-travelling. The article is speculative in nature, so will undoubtedly overlook
some of the subtleties both in the doctrine of Real Presence and in the meta-
physics. Nevertheless I hope to open up some conceptual space for the application
of different theories in contemporary philosophy to the long-standing problem
of how to understand what it would be for Christ to be fully present in the
Eucharist.
The next section of the article will briefly introduce the theological doctrine in
three steps, and elaborate three sets of philosophical issues that correspondingly
arise. The first is mentioned simply because overlooking it would be perverse, but
I will not attempt to discuss it. The second and third issues are the target of this
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article. They will be discussed in the third and fourth sections of the article
respectively. In brief, they offer philosophical challenges to the coherence of the
doctrine of Real Presence; they lead one to doubt that what is claimed of the
Eucharist is even possible. I will show that these issues for the Real Presence
doctrine exactly parallel what would be happening in the world if an object were to
undergo certain sorts of unusual procedures (specifically time-travel). If it is
conceptually coherent that objects can behave in this way, then we have a model
for the behaviour of the Eucharist which shows the doctrine to be coherent (with
respect to the second and third issues raised). Therefore if time-travel is coherent
then it is at least possible that the Eucharist behave in the way described by the
Real Presence doctrine, though I offer no positive arguments to the effect that
it does.
Before beginning in earnest, however, it is worth making a disclaimer with
respect to the conditional claim above. The article attempts to show that some of
the philosophical issues connected with the doctrine of Real Presence are no more
problematic than those that arise from objects time-travelling in certain ways. If
you think that time-travel (of the sort I appeal to below) is impossible on con-
ceptual grounds, you may not find such a result especially interesting. For this
I apologize. But there are many, metaphysicians and others, who think that such
time-travel is not conceptually incoherent. If you do not belong to that number,
I hope that the article still retains some interest in virtue of showing that your
misguided colleagues who do believe in the conceptual coherence of time-travel
ought be no more perturbed by some of the seemingly peculiar claims of the
doctrine.
The doctrine of Real Presence
In Roman Catholic theology, as well as in the Eastern Orthodox and some
other Christian Churches, the Eucharist is a process by which Christ becomes
really present. I will focus on the Catholic doctrine for the sake of simplicity.
Without going into the complexity of the view, the idea is that as a consequence of
the actions of the priest during the mass, the bread and wine once consecrated
literally become the body and blood of Christ. To make it a little more precise, let’s
label the things on the altar A and B. A is what begins as the bread, and B is what
begins as the wine. Before the consecration has happened, A and B are bread and
wine. After the consecration, however, A and B are the body and blood of Christ.
Call this thesis RP (for Real Presence):
RP: A and B are the body and blood of Christ
But things are more complicated than this makes it appear. First, both the bread
and the wine each become both the body and blood of Christ; A is the body and
blood of Christ, as is B. Moreover, not only are A and B each transformed into the
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body and blood of Christ, but they each are transformed into thewhole of the body
and blood of Christ. This is captured by our thesis below:
RP: A and B are each the whole body and blood of Christ
A yet further level of complication is added by an additional claim. When A and B
are distributed among those who consume them, it is claimed that each of the
receivers receives the whole body and blood of Christ. A, which is bread pre-
consecration, can be distributed by being broken into seemingly smaller pieces. B,
which is wine pre-consecration, is distributed when individuals consume portions
by having a sip. Thus we have the thesis:
RP: When A and B are distributed, all of the resulting entities are the whole body and blood
of Christ.
These theses raise a number of philosophical problems. I shall consider the
theses RP, RP and RP in turn.
. The most obvious problem is with RP and is twofold. On the one hand
what is there on the altar after the consecration doesn’t look like a
body and some blood, doesn’t act like a body and some blood, doesn’t
smell, taste, or feel like a body or some blood. How can it, then, actually
be Christ’s body and blood? On the other hand what is on the altar
looks, acts, smells, tastes, and feels like bread and wine. How, then, can
it not be bread and wine? One thought might be that it is both bread
and wine and the body and blood of Christ, which would at least deal
with the second aspect of this worry. But this view, known as
consubstantiation, is explicitly denied in a Catholic setting. It is
claimed that the post-consecration material ceases to be bread and
wine; it is only Christ’s body and blood.
This has puzzled Christian theologians for some time. Drawing
on Aristotelian metaphysics, Aquinas and others developed a theory
according to which the accidents of the entities remain the same
while the substance changes. This is the interpretation known as
transubstantiation, which attempts to address this twofold problem.
There are, of course, reasonable questions about Aristotelian
metaphysics and the theory of transubstantiation generally. There is
also a need to try to understand this doctrine in a way informed by
progress in philosophy since Aquinas and Aristotle. But this large task
will not be addressed here. Instead, this article is restricted to two other
problems that arise from the doctrine of Real Presence, and in
particular from RP and RP.
. RP raises a second issue. It states that the whole of the body and
blood of Christ is present in the Eucharist. But it is possible (and in fact
the case) that there are multiple consecrations. Suppose that the
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appropriate events happen in both London and Mumbai at the same
time. This means that the body and blood of Christ is simultaneously
present as a whole in both London and Mumbai. How is it possible for
one thing to be simultaneously present as a whole in more than one
place? How can all of the body and blood of Christ be present in
different locations?
In fact, this problem is apparent even if there is only one
consecration at any time. For RP states that each of A and B are the
whole body and blood of Christ. So Christ’s whole body and blood are
present at the same altar twice over; once in A and once in B.
Thus RP commits one to the view that Christ’s body and blood can
occupy different regions of spacetime in some way that vindicates the
claim that the whole of his body and blood are present in each region.
This seems unusual to say the least. We are owed further explanation.
. The third issue is even more troubling, and is derived from RP.
It states that entities resulting from the distribution of A and B are also
themselves the whole body and blood of Christ. That is, the entities
consumed, which seem smaller than A and B and appear to be parts of
A and B, are the whole body and blood of Christ. It is not immediately
clear how to understand this. It is not simply like the case of water,
where every part of some water is water (at least down to the molecular
level). Rather, the object that is A is numerically identical with some
object which we find after the distribution of A. This strange claim will
raise issues of mereology; the relation of parts and wholes. It is unclear
whether any objects can be this way, and therefore whether it’s
coherent to assert this of the Eucharist.
The three issues that have been introduced by no means exhaust the puzzling
philosophical aspects of the theological claims encapsulated by RP, RP and RP.
But the latter two are topics that I hope to shed light on through contemporary
metaphysics. In the next section, I begin with RP.
Modelling RP
To provide a way of understanding RP, I first need briefly to introduce
some metaphysical concepts. These concern the continued existence of material
objects over time. Consider, for example, a tree, which begins life as an acorn,
grows into a sapling, and then into an adult tree. Eventually, it dies and ceases to
be. The tree comes into existence, continues to exist throughout its lifetime, and
then perishes. Or consider a clock, which is carefully constructed by a clockmaker
and then ticks away until one day it is taken apart. Likewise, the clock comes to
be, exists for a period of time, and then ceases to exist. The world is populated by
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such objects. But there are competing philosophical theories to account for
this phenomenon. A neutral term for existence through time is persistence. The
tree, the clock, we ourselves, and many other things persist. The two ways to
understand persistence are called endurance and perdurance. While the precise
difference between these is a matter of detailed debate, the general idea is that an
object endures if it is wholly present at each time at which it exists, and an object
perdures if it exists through time by having different parts at different times. The
perdurance account suggests that objects have temporal parts in the way that, for
example, roads have spatial parts. Endurance theorists deny this, and claim that
objects can have spatial but not temporal parts. To put it in metaphorical terms,
an enduring object moves through time, whereas a perduring object is spread out
across time.
Now, let’s consider RP with these in mind. First it can be shown that
perdurance accounts can provide the conceptual machinery to avoid the worry
that RP has elicited. For the perdurantist, being really present somewhere will be
a matter of having some relation to something located at that place. For instance,
Jane’s being really present in the football stadium is a matter of something located
in the football stadium (Jane’s temporal part) being related to Jane by the relation
‘being a temporal part of’. Now, the nature of this relation is up for discussion;
one plausible candidate is some counterpart relation that holds among all
temporal parts. But whatever the relation is, it should be able to hold of more
than one thing at a time. For instance, consider what the perdurantist will want
to say about Jane if she time-travels back to a period in which she previously
existed. There will then be two distinct things at a time, one of which is older
than the other. But both seem to be Jane, i.e. have appropriate temporal-part
relations.
If this is so, the perdurance account gives one model for the Eucharist as
described by RP. RP states that A and B are each the whole body and blood of
Christ, and therefore that Christ’s body and blood is multiply located at a time. But
if this is just a matter of certain relations holding then there is no reason why God
couldn’t coherently miraculously make these relations hold. This is particularly
clear if the relations are fundamental, but even if they are derived from some
further relations or properties it is plausible that God could imbue A and B with
the appropriate further relations or properties to ensure that A and B are indeed
both the whole body and blood of Christ.
To an endurance theorist this will not be an acceptable interpretation of RP.
For the endurance theorist doesn’t accept that any relation other than identity can
be what holds between an object at one time and the same object at another time.
Hence, to give a full account of RP we need a model for the Eucharist within an
endurance picture. Luckily, it is quite simple to provide one. Being really present
somewhere, for the endurantist, is a matter of being wholly present somewhere,
i.e. it is simply a matter of being somewhere. So the body and blood of Christ,
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which is wholly present in A on the altar and in B on the altar (and in C in Mumbai,
and . . .) is an enduring object multiply located in space at one time. But this can
also be understood by appeal to the analogous situation of time-travel. Imagine
you have an enduring object, say a pencil, which time-travels. Suppose the pencil
is put in a time-travel machine by a scientist and is sent back to the previous week.
In such a case you have a pencil which is wholly present at more than one spatial
location at a time. This pencil will therefore give an analogue of the multiply
located Eucharist.
Thus it seems that RP is explainable both in perdurance and in endurance
terms, relying on an analogy with a time-travelling object. If you accept the meta-
physical possibility of time-travel, therefore, you ought to accept the metaphysical
possibility of multilocation and hence the metaphysical possibility of RP, given
that God can do at least whatever is metaphysically possible.
Modelling RP
To explore the philosophical issues raised by RP it is necessary to be
precise about what it claims. It says that A and B are the whole body and blood
of Christ, and that when A and B are distributed each portion is also the whole
body and blood of Christ. This is obviously unusual. Consider a typical example of
distribution: a family stew, say, being divided into servings. You would not say that
each of the servings is the whole stew; the servings are rather parts of the stew
which together compose the whole of the stew. In order to show the conceptual
coherence of RP I offer two ways that it could be satisfied. The first is simpler but
requires numerous miracles. The second is more complicated but gives a more
elegant account. Either, I take it, is sufficient to prove the possibility of an object
behaving in the way the RP describes.
The first of the ways to conceive of an object satisfying RP is to appeal again to
the notion of an object time-travelling. This furnishes us with the concept of a
single object multiply located at a time. What RP states is that during distribution
the individual portions are in fact a single entity multiply located. Thus after A is
broken into two equal portions, the left portion (A) and the right portion (A) are
both identical with the whole body and blood of Christ. If the whole body and
blood of Christ is labelled C then the following identities hold: A=C, A=C. By
the transitivity of identity, A=A. But this is perfectly acceptable, as A and A
can be related in the way that a time-travelling enduring particular relates to itself
at that earlier time: they are strictly identical (though may have different
properties).
So A=A. Furthermore, A=A and A=A. The results of the distribution (the
portions) are identical with the whole pre-distribution entity. And, as noted in
relation to RP, A=B, so A and A are identical with B as well. Though these
identity relations might appear strange, they are not formally inconsistent.
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This picture asserts that when one seemingly breaks A into pieces what you end up
with is multiple instances or versions of the very same A, akin to the results of
time-travel. You end up with an entity with additional locations at that time.
Likewise when one distributes what was originally wine, B (paradigmatically by
having a sip).
How this happens is manifestly unclear, however. One way to conceive of it is
that at the point when A is seemingly divided A time-travels to exactly the same
moment of time: it already exists at this time so it thereby becomes present twice
over at that time. Both the time-travel and the non-time-travel versions of A would
also have to shrink in size by a half. This seems metaphysically possible, i.e. an
omnipotent God who could bring about anything metaphysically possible could
bring about such a state of affairs. It would require a huge number of miracles to
produce such a result: every time consecrated material is distributed God would
have to act repeatedly to ensure that this quasi-time-travel occurs. God would
have to change the world in this strange way every time the consecrated host
was apparently divided. This makes it much less plausible as a theory of what is
actually supposed to happen. But this could happen, and hence RP is not
metaphysically incoherent. However, to underwrite this claim further I offer a
second interpretation of what happens that is also consistent and requires less in
the way of miraculous intervention.
This second interpretation looks more closely at the mereology involved, i.e. the
relations of parthood that obtain. Rather than requiring a miracle every time A or B
is divided, this approach only requires a single miraculous change from bread or
wine to the body and blood of Christ in consecration, but posits that the body and
blood of Christ has a complex and unusual mereological structure. Let’s give some
more detail. RP states that the portions that result from a distribution of A or B are
all the whole body and blood of Christ. One way for this to be is for each part of
A and B to be identical with the whole body and blood of Christ. In other words,
A and B have parts and each of these parts is identical with the whole body and
blood of Christ. So A has a right half and a left half, and each of these halves is
identical with the whole body and blood of Christ. Furthermore, A itself is also the
whole body and blood of Christ. This certainly sounds odd. But to see its
coherence, imagine the following situation:
Consider a wall, which is made up of bricks. Call the wall W and the bricks
b–bn. Now imagine a time-travel machine that not only sends objects back in time
but also significantly decreases their size. Thus if I put a pencil in this machine it
will appear at some time in the past and significantly smaller. Now suppose thatW
is put in this machine at some time t. It is sent back in time to t* and is significantly
reduced in size, say to the size of a brick. Let’s call the brick-sized wall that arrives
w. After some time, and after t, suppose that w is then put in a converse
machine and sent back to t, arriving at its original size. The operation is then
repeated on W so that numerous other brick-sized objects identical with W arrive
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at the past time, t*. These are labelled w–wn. So far everything seems plausible (if
rather bizarre). As a final step, put w–wn together at t to create a wall. The twist is
the following: suppose the resulting wall is in fact W. The bricks which make up
the original wall are actually the wall itself, having time-travelled and shrunk, i.e.
w–wn are in fact b–bn.
This scenario may be extremely strange, but it seems conceptually possible. The
consequence of such an odd occurrence would be that there is an object,W, which
is multiply located at a time and whose locations at that time arrange it in the form
of a large object composed of smaller objects. W seems to be composed of parts,
each of which isW. This is akin to what is asserted in RP of the Eucharist: there is
an object (the whole body and blood of Christ) which seems to be composed of
numerous versions of itself. The example is not quite perfect, though. In RP it is
claimed that every part of A and B are the whole body and blood of Christ. This
isn’t true for W, as parts of W that are smaller than brick-sized are not wholly W.
There are two options here to perfect the example, corresponding to the two ways
the world could be. In the first place, the world could contain simples (objects
which cannot be divided into parts). In the second place, the world could be
infinitely divisible: at every level of magnification there would be complex objects
which can be divided into parts. Let me give a version of the example for each
option.
If the world is as described in the latter way, it is called gunky. Then one can
simply iterate the example to accommodate the fact that every part of A and B are
the whole body and blood of Christ: every brick b–bn (which are all shrunken,
time-travelling W ) is itself made up of parts which are the brick itself sent back in
time and decreased in size by an equivalent machine. And the same applies at the
next level down, and so on, and so on. You would then have an object in which, no
matter how closely you looked, you would still find the whole original object. Thus
if the world is gunky one can use this as a model for the behaviour of the Eucharist.
If the world isn’t gunky, i.e. if there are mereological simples, then the example
can be adjusted accordingly. Take a mereological simple m. Put it in a standard
time-travel machine repeatedly. Then collectm–mn and arrange them in the form
of a composite object O. What the precise status of O is to be is a matter of
debate. But whatever our preferred interpretation of such cases, one can use
exactly the same interpretation for the Eucharist according to RP. For you can
take the whole body and blood of Christ to be a mereological simple; A can then
have a mereological structure just like O. When A is broken and distributed, each
of the resulting entities will be the whole body and blood of Christ, and this will be
true for every way of distributing A. And at the most fine-grained level you will
reach analogues of m–mn that can be all identical with one another and Christ’s
body and blood. Thus it has been proven that, whether the world is gunky or
contains simple objects, time-travel can give models for how the Eucharist is
supposed to be behaving according to RP.
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Though these models do not require frequent miracles, as with our first
example, they do need strange parthood structures that make A and B into bizarre
objects (and it isn’t clear what the best way of understanding this is). Whether one
prefers the miraculous approach or bizarre mereology is, I feel, a matter of taste.
But either proves it is possible for an object to be the way that RP alleges that
A and B are, and hence demonstrates that RP is conceptually coherent.
Conclusion
In this article I have been trying to offer the doctrine of the Real Presence of
Christ in the Eucharist some resources independently garnered from analytic
metaphysics. The central claim is the following: some significant subset of the
problems faced by the doctrine can be shown to be analogous to issues for normal
objects in some bizarre cases. Although the examples used are esoteric, this is
how ordinary objects would behave in extraordinary circumstances. This being so,
the defender of the Real Presence doctrine can claim that the Eucharistic process
furnishes precisely such extraordinary circumstances. I have argued that she
would therefore be able to avoid at least some of the philosophical issues that have
been raised.
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Notes
. There is extensive debate on this topic, but a good starting point is Smith () and Arntzenius &
Maudlin (), with their bibliographies. Time-travel is difficult to square with a view in the
philosophy of time called presentism: the theory that the only objects that exist are those that presently
exist. Presentists, therefore, might be inclined to resist the thesis of the article. But note that in order to
resist in this way, presentists would need to claim not only that presentism is true, but that the
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alternative to their view (eternalism) is conceptually incoherent, otherwise the conceptual coherence of
time-travel in eternalism would establish the conceptual coherence of the behaviour of the Eucharist
described in the next section.
. See Leftow () for a similar methodological approach: he uses a time-travel example to provide an
analogy for an account he develops of the Trinity. For those unconvinced of the possibility of time-
travel see especially ibid., –, where Leftow argues both for the possibility of time-travel and for
the distinct claim that, even if impossible, time-travel analogies might be useful to make clear how to
understand the doctrine.
. The idea here is that A and B are converted into the body and blood of Christ, not simply replaced by
them (thanks to John Heil for this point). Therefore I am not using ‘A’ and ‘B’ to refer to one thing
before the consecration and another thing afterwards, which would raise questions of the reference of
terms. This sort of issue belongs to a group of problems I will not address, as described later.
. This might suggest that the result of the consecration is a perfect mixture of the body and blood of Christ.
. RP and RP are asserted in by the Council of Trent (XIII iii) thus:
Wherefore it is most true, that as much is contained under either species as under both; for Christ
whole and entire is under the species of bread, and under any part whatsoever of that species;
likewise the whole (Christ) is under the species of wine, and under the parts thereof.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church () puts it as follows: ‘Christ is present whole and entire in
each of the species and whole and entire in each of their parts, in such a way that the breaking of the
bread does not divide Christ.’ RP and RP are therefore included in the Roman Catholic doctrine.
I interpret ‘part’ here to refer to entities resulting from the distribution of A or B, rather than to
mereological parts of A and B before distribution. If we take ‘part’ in the latter sense, RP is entailed by
but weaker than the doctrine. The stronger view can still be accommodated, though one interpretation
is ruled out (see notes  and ). Thanks to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for highlighting this.
. John Heil has pointed out to me that the whole substance, i.e. the whole hylomorphic compound of
matter and form, is what changes according to transubstantiation.
. It is less often noted that another consequence of RP is that the body and blood are present as a whole
at different times as well – both at the Christmas mass and at the Easter celebration. A straightforward
reading of this implies an endurance rather than perdurance picture of the persistence of the Eucharist.
. There is a connected concern here, given that Christ is supposed to exist not only in the consecrated
material but also in heaven. This issue deserves attention, but it will not receive it here. It would
require a serious discussion of the metaphysics of heaven and theories of location that permit
non-spatiotemporal location, and such a discussion is beyond the modest scope of this article.
. One might think that there are further issues if the different instances of the Eucharist at one time have
different properties. But it isn’t clear that the Eucharist has different properties in different places, and
even if so this seems reducible to the problem of change raised by Lewis (, ff.), which has its
own solutions. See Pruss (), – for discussion.
. Baber (, –) has a discussion of location and multiple location for the Eucharist. Her
convention-based solution, however, takes a less realist approach than what is presented here.
. I use the term ‘perdurance’ here to include both the traditional Lewisian four-dimensional spacetime
worm and the exdurance or stage-theory view popularized by Sider () and Hawley ().
Thus I take endurance and perdurance to categorize possible of theories of persistence exhaustively
(or, at least, actual theories of persistence).
It is important to note that the endurance/perdurance debate has a complex relationship to the
presentism/eternalism debate (indicated in note ). I consider the debates orthogonal, but this is a
matter of continued discussion. Even those who consider the distinctions connected should admit at
least that it isn’t clear that endurance entails presentism (which is, at least on the surface, hostile to
time-travel).
. This is key. One seemingly natural way to understand the notion of Real Presence is through whole
presence, in the endurantist’s terms. But the perdurantist must have a different interpretation of the
claim that something is ‘really’ present somewhere (or else the doctrine of the Real Presence entails
endurantism, and the two seem independent). One option would be to claim that the formulation of
the doctrine should be understood as almost completely metaphysically neutral, so that the terms
involved should not be given any metaphysical weight (my thanks to Robin Le Poidevin for this
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suggestion). ‘Real’ presence could then simply be a way of ruling out contrary notions of presence such
as metaphorical or analogical presence.
. It should be clear from this and the above note that, for the perdurantist, the ‘whole’ in RP means
something other than wholly present in the endurantist’s sense.
. Pruss (, sect. ) discusses these issues at greater length, and investigates the coherence of multiple
location in general. I only make the conditional claim here that, if multiple location is reasonable, then
the Eucharist can be understood as multiply located. I also think that multiple location is reasonable,
especially as it is a consequence of the seemingly coherent cases of time-travel mentioned, but I don’t
argue for this. While Pruss takes the Eucharist to be ‘non-robustly’ multilocated, I am happy to consider
it multilocated in a robust sense, i.e. just as a time-travelling object is multilocated.
There are connected questions concerning universals; they are normally understood as those things
which are capable of being multiply located. But I’m not tempted to the view that the body and blood
of Christ is a universal, nor by the view that time-travelling objects become universals. I think what
needs to be adjusted is our definition of universals (but space will not allow a longer discussion).
. Here and in what follows, I will use the language of endurance. I do so for ease of exposition, but either
endurance or perdurance can give appropriate notions of multiple location and parthood to make the
analogies work.
. This might seem to violate the indiscernibility of identicals. There isn’t space to discuss this here, but it
is a problem for any account of time-travel in changing particulars. It is closely related to the problem
of change, solutions to which give some alternatives here too. See also note .
. The non-time-travelling version of A would also continue to exist through time, which is unlike typical
cases of time-travel.
. A second way to imagine that A and A are identical with A is to view A as an extended simple (i.e. an
object which has no parts but occupies a region of space). When A seems to be divided, then, what is
actually occurring is that the extended simple A is becoming multiply located as A and A in smaller
regions of space. The mechanism for this would have to be, it seems, as in the text, miraculous
intervention. This would also trivially capture the stronger version of the doctrine indicated in note ,
where Christ is wholly present in any mereological parts of A and B, because A and B would not have
parts.
. A second motivation for looking for another interpretation is that it accommodates the stronger version
of the doctrine noted in note  and in the above note, without requiring extended simples.
. This example is similar to those in Gilmore (), which were introduced as an argument in favour of
endurance over perdurance, and Effingham & Robson (), which is an argument in the other
direction. Effingham and Robson introduce a wall of time-travelling bricks: here there is the reverse
example.
. It may be inaccurate to label something brick-sized as a wall. What the necessary conditions are for
falling under this sortal are not obvious to me, but the example is unaffected by whether or not the
arriving object is a wall. It is still, at least, the same object.
. Though see the next note.
. One view is that O is an object in addition to m–mn. This entails a denial of classical mereology,
specifically the principle of weak supplementation which states that a composite object will have more
than one proper part. Another view is that it is not, in which case O might simply be identical with
m–mn (i.e. with m). Either of these options has costs (see Effingham & Robson () for discussion)
and there will be other alternatives (e.g. Gilmore (), who argues for a four-placed parthood
relation). But I take it that none of the costs makes the options incoherent, and hence simply provide
further precision about the conceptual model that such a view of the Eucharist would entail. The key
point is that the example is coherent.
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comments and feedback during the process of writing this article. The final stages of the research
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